Bug 308713 – Integer overflow in IndexedDB string key length bypasses bounds check

• Status: RESOLVED
• Resolution: FIXED
• Component: WebCore Misc.

[Jarred Sumner]

I found this via Claude Code Security. Please don't credit me personally.

SUMMARY

In the string key deserialization path of decodeKey() at Source/WebCore/Modules/indexeddb/server/IDBSerialization.cpp:326, the bounds check data.size() < length * 2 uses 32-bit unsigned arithmetic for the multiplication (length is uint32_t). When length >= 0x80000000, length * 2 wraps to a small value, bypassing the check. The subsequent reserveInitialCapacity(length) attempts to allocate ~4GB, causing an OOM crash.

DETAILS

At IDBSerialization.cpp:321-330:

  case SIDBKeyType::String: {
      uint32_t length;
      if (!readLittleEndian(data, length))
          return false;
      if (data.size() < length * 2)    // uint32_t * 2 overflows
          return false;
      Vector<char16_t> buffer;
      buffer.reserveInitialCapacity(length);   // tries to reserve ~2GB+ entries

For example, length=0x80000000 gives length*2=0 (wrap), so data.size() < 0 is always false, and the check passes. The binary key case (nearby code) correctly uses uint64_t for its size field and has a separate > std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max() check, confirming this string case is missing equivalent protection.

SUGGESTED FIX

Cast length to size_t before multiplying: if (data.size() < static_cast<size_t>(length) * 2).

[Radar WebKit Bug Importer]

<rdar://problem/171245941>

[Anne van Kesteren]

https://github.com/WebKit/WebKit/pull/59885

[EWS]

Committed 308649@main (e5eb16d1eda3): <https://commits.webkit.org/308649@main>

Reviewed commits have been landed. Closing PR #59885 and removing active labels.