<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes" ?>
<!DOCTYPE bugzilla SYSTEM "https://bugs.webkit.org/page.cgi?id=bugzilla.dtd">

<bugzilla version="5.0.4.1"
          urlbase="https://bugs.webkit.org/"
          
          maintainer="admin@webkit.org"
>

    <bug>
          <bug_id>184573</bug_id>
          
          <creation_ts>2018-04-12 17:26:38 -0700</creation_ts>
          <short_desc>[GTK] Webkit should spoof as Safari on a Mac for Outlook.com</short_desc>
          <delta_ts>2018-05-15 07:18:58 -0700</delta_ts>
          <reporter_accessible>1</reporter_accessible>
          <cclist_accessible>1</cclist_accessible>
          <classification_id>1</classification_id>
          <classification>Unclassified</classification>
          <product>WebKit</product>
          <component>WebKitGTK</component>
          <version>Other</version>
          <rep_platform>PC</rep_platform>
          <op_sys>Linux</op_sys>
          <bug_status>REOPENED</bug_status>
          <resolution></resolution>
          
          
          <bug_file_loc></bug_file_loc>
          <status_whiteboard></status_whiteboard>
          <keywords></keywords>
          <priority>P2</priority>
          <bug_severity>Normal</bug_severity>
          <target_milestone>---</target_milestone>
          
          
          <everconfirmed>1</everconfirmed>
          <reporter name="Ryan Farmer">rfarmer84</reporter>
          <assigned_to name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</assigned_to>
          <cc>bugs-noreply</cc>
    
    <cc>clopez</cc>
    
    <cc>commit-queue</cc>
    
    <cc>ews-watchlist</cc>
    
    <cc>mcatanzaro</cc>
          

      

      

      

          <comment_sort_order>oldest_to_newest</comment_sort_order>  
          <long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1414247</commentid>
    <comment_count>0</comment_count>
    <who name="Ryan Farmer">rfarmer84</who>
    <bug_when>2018-04-12 17:26:38 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>I originally opened this as a bug on GNOME Web, but was told to open one here.

When you visit Outlook.com in GNOME Web with default user agent, you get a &quot;basic&quot; version of the webmail site which is intended for obsolete web browsers.

According to Microsoft, the only supported browsers are Internet Explorer, Edge, Safari, and Chrome, and it seems like anything else is an &quot;unknown&quot; that gets the bare bones site.

In fact, spoofing the UA as Safari 11.1 on a Mac loads the full version, which works fine. According to a similar bug related to Google websites, Webkit tells Google that it is Chromium so it&apos;ll load the full site and shut up about spamming the user to get Chrome. Apparently, Michael Catanzaro hit a wall trying to get Google to stop doing this on their end, and it&apos;s likely a lost cause trying to get Microsoft to stop this idiocy as well.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1414421</commentid>
    <comment_count>1</comment_count>
    <who name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</who>
    <bug_when>2018-04-13 09:05:10 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Yeah, user agent evangelism is a lost cause, let&apos;s just add it to the quirks list. Websites forfeit their right to receive an accurate user agent from WebKit when they sent fallback content to our users.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1414429</commentid>
    <comment_count>2</comment_count>
      <attachid>337894</attachid>
    <who name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</who>
    <bug_when>2018-04-13 09:10:51 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Created attachment 337894
Patch</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1414432</commentid>
    <comment_count>3</comment_count>
    <who name="EWS Watchlist">ews-watchlist</who>
    <bug_when>2018-04-13 09:13:03 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Attachment 337894 did not pass style-queue:


ERROR: Tools/ChangeLog:3:  Please consider whether the use of security-sensitive phrasing could help someone exploit WebKit: spoof  [changelog/unwantedsecurityterms] [3]
ERROR: Source/WebCore/ChangeLog:3:  Please consider whether the use of security-sensitive phrasing could help someone exploit WebKit: spoof  [changelog/unwantedsecurityterms] [3]
Total errors found: 2 in 4 files


If any of these errors are false positives, please file a bug against check-webkit-style.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1414433</commentid>
    <comment_count>4</comment_count>
    <who name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</who>
    <bug_when>2018-04-13 09:13:09 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Ah, we already have a quirk for Outlook, but only for one particular university installation:

    // Microsoft Outlook Web App forces users with WebKitGTK+&apos;s standard user
    // agent to use the light version. Earlier versions even blocks users from
    // accessing the calendar.
    if (domain == &quot;mail.ntu.edu.tw&quot;)
        return true;

Sadly this is one of those cases where we have to add a quirk separately for every domain found to be running Outlook.

Now, we could run into one problem here. The quirk I added only works if the resource that makes the decision to send the crap fallback site is hosted on outlook.live.com. In testing Google quirks, I&apos;ve found that sometimes the quirk has to be set for various other domains as well. So I&apos;m not confident this will actually work without testing. We might need to use the quirk for all of live.com, for instance, or restrict it to other subdomains. If you&apos;re enterprising and willing to rebuild WebKit to test it to make sure the quirk works, that would be ideal.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1415470</commentid>
    <comment_count>5</comment_count>
      <attachid>337894</attachid>
    <who name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</who>
    <bug_when>2018-04-17 21:37:23 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Comment on attachment 337894
Patch

I guess we&apos;ll find out whether it works or not once it gets released.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1415476</commentid>
    <comment_count>6</comment_count>
      <attachid>337894</attachid>
    <who name="WebKit Commit Bot">commit-queue</who>
    <bug_when>2018-04-17 22:05:30 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Comment on attachment 337894
Patch

Clearing flags on attachment: 337894

Committed r230749: &lt;https://trac.webkit.org/changeset/230749&gt;</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1415477</commentid>
    <comment_count>7</comment_count>
    <who name="WebKit Commit Bot">commit-queue</who>
    <bug_when>2018-04-17 22:05:31 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>All reviewed patches have been landed.  Closing bug.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1421279</commentid>
    <comment_count>8</comment_count>
    <who name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-07 07:34:43 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Please test this in 2.20.2 so we can find out if it worked.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422170</commentid>
    <comment_count>9</comment_count>
    <who name="Ryan Farmer">rfarmer84</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-09 00:34:34 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>I don&apos;t see Webkit GTK 2.20.2 built for Fedora 28 yet.

I&apos;ll keep an eye for an RPM on Koji.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422262</commentid>
    <comment_count>10</comment_count>
    <who name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-09 08:24:37 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>https://bodhi.fedoraproject.org/updates/FEDORA-2018-97c58e29e4</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422419</commentid>
    <comment_count>11</comment_count>
    <who name="Ryan Farmer">rfarmer84</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-09 12:50:26 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>It seems to only work if you aren&apos;t already logged in and go to outlook.com and login (full website) or go directly to outlook.live.com (full website). 

If you go to outlook.com and you&apos;re already signed into your account, there&apos;s a redirect to outlook.live.com/owa and you get the basic webmail.

So, it seems that the patch fixes it under certain conditions, but not if you go directly to &quot;outlook.com&quot; and get the redirect

This site is such a mess.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422423</commentid>
    <comment_count>12</comment_count>
    <who name="Ryan Farmer">rfarmer84</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-09 12:57:04 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Michael, it looks like the patch is only spoofing for outlook.live.com.

It looks like going after outlook.com too is going to be what it takes to get this to work. :/</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422439</commentid>
    <comment_count>13</comment_count>
    <who name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-09 13:19:46 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>OK, we can try that...</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422602</commentid>
    <comment_count>14</comment_count>
      <attachid>340060</attachid>
    <who name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-09 19:06:23 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Created attachment 340060
Patch</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422605</commentid>
    <comment_count>15</comment_count>
    <who name="EWS Watchlist">ews-watchlist</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-09 19:08:41 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Attachment 340060 did not pass style-queue:


ERROR: Source/WebCore/ChangeLog:3:  Please consider whether the use of security-sensitive phrasing could help someone exploit WebKit: spoof  [changelog/unwantedsecurityterms] [3]
Total errors found: 1 in 2 files


If any of these errors are false positives, please file a bug against check-webkit-style.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422610</commentid>
    <comment_count>16</comment_count>
    <who name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-09 19:12:40 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Please test this F28 scratch build once it&apos;s finished (and let me know if the build fails): https://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/taskinfo?taskID=26866056</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422633</commentid>
    <comment_count>17</comment_count>
    <who name="Ryan Farmer">rfarmer84</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-09 22:35:34 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Seems like the fallback site is still loading if you go to outlook.com and get the redirect.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422634</commentid>
    <comment_count>18</comment_count>
    <who name="Ryan Farmer">rfarmer84</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-09 22:39:05 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>I just noticed that with the package webkitgtk3-jsc, I get:

Error unpacking rpm package webkit2gtk3-jsc-2.20.2-2.fc28.x86_64
Error unpacking rpm package webkit2gtk3-jsc-2.20.2-2.fc28.x86_64
error: unpacking of archive failed on file /usr/lib64/libjavascriptcoregtk-4.0.so.18.7.10;5af3da69: cpio: read
webkit2gtk3-jsc-2.20.2-2.fc28.x86_64 was supposed to be installed but is not!

The other two packages (Webkit itself and the GTK2 plugin package) installed though.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422712</commentid>
    <comment_count>19</comment_count>
    <who name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-10 07:19:06 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>(In reply to Ryan Farmer from comment #17)
&gt; Seems like the fallback site is still loading if you go to outlook.com and
&gt; get the redirect.

Strange. So what I have there is the most aggressive heuristic I could come up with: any request with the base domain &quot;outlook.com&quot; or &quot;live.com&quot; will get the special user agent. That includes outlook.live.com. So that tells us that there is some other domain that needs to receive the quirk. Your best bet is to open the web inspector (ctrl+shift+I) and switch to the Resources tab before loading the page, see if any resources are being loaded from elsewhere.

(In reply to Ryan Farmer from comment #18)
&gt; I just noticed that with the package webkitgtk3-jsc, I get:
&gt; 
&gt; Error unpacking rpm package webkit2gtk3-jsc-2.20.2-2.fc28.x86_64
&gt; Error unpacking rpm package webkit2gtk3-jsc-2.20.2-2.fc28.x86_64
&gt; error: unpacking of archive failed on file
&gt; /usr/lib64/libjavascriptcoregtk-4.0.so.18.7.10;5af3da69: cpio: read
&gt; webkit2gtk3-jsc-2.20.2-2.fc28.x86_64 was supposed to be installed but is not!
&gt; 
&gt; The other two packages (Webkit itself and the GTK2 plugin package) installed
&gt; though.

Not sure why it failed, but shouldn&apos;t matter as the code change is in WebCore.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422725</commentid>
    <comment_count>20</comment_count>
    <who name="Ryan Farmer">rfarmer84</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-10 08:34:50 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Outlook.com redirects too quickly to catch what it&apos;s trying to load in the inspector in Web, so I loaded it in Opera with the inspector on and Javascript disabled.

Outlook.com seems to load a gigantic nasty obfuscated Javascript file from ow1.res.office365.com

https://ow1.res.office365.com/owamail/20180427.03.02/scripts/owa.mail.js

In the basic version of the site, it also looks like we get some CSS files and numerous images from r1.res.office365.com 

Once you&apos;re actually on the full mail website, there are resources pulled in from Skype, AOL, and tons of other stuff, but since the redirect itself only seems to pull in &quot;owa.mail.js&quot;, it might be an idea to go after office365.com

-----

So it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck. Maybe office365.com needs the spoof too.

Right now, it&apos;s sitting at:

Go to outlook.com and sign in: Get full Outlook Mail.

Go to outlook.com while already signed in: Get fallback site.

Go to outlook.live.com while already signed in: Get full Outlook Mail.

Go to outlook.live.com and sign in: Get full Outlook Mail.

Go to office.com and click on any of the Outlook Mail icons while signed in, get directed to Outlook.com and get the fallback site.

-----

I&apos;ve been browsing around with the user agent set to Safari 11.1 on Mac OS to see if anything related to Office 365 breaks if you spoof as Safari, and found that actually not much of the Office 365 site loads anything from office365.com. Most of it is from live.com subdomains and various CDNs.

Should Webkit after all of offfice365.com with a UA spoof and see if that fixes Outlook? 

With the way Microsoft has set Outlook/Office up, it looks dodgy as hell (obfuscript, vendor prefixed CSS, etc.), and I&apos;m concerned that if the spoof goes after subdomains, Microsoft might change the name of them for some reason later on.

Plus, it seems like Outlook and Office 365 are more or less the same service these days. Gone is the simple utilitarian Hotmail.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422734</commentid>
    <comment_count>21</comment_count>
      <attachid>340093</attachid>
    <who name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-10 09:12:30 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Created attachment 340093
Patch</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422735</commentid>
    <comment_count>22</comment_count>
    <who name="EWS Watchlist">ews-watchlist</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-10 09:13:59 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Attachment 340093 did not pass style-queue:


ERROR: Source/WebCore/ChangeLog:3:  Please consider whether the use of security-sensitive phrasing could help someone exploit WebKit: spoof  [changelog/unwantedsecurityterms] [3]
Total errors found: 1 in 2 files


If any of these errors are false positives, please file a bug against check-webkit-style.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422736</commentid>
    <comment_count>23</comment_count>
    <who name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-10 09:14:43 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Here&apos;s another scratch build that will use the quirk for office365.com: https://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/taskinfo?taskID=26877229</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422788</commentid>
    <comment_count>24</comment_count>
    <who name="Ryan Farmer">rfarmer84</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-10 11:25:25 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Blast.

Well, that doesn&apos;t fix the Outlook.com redirect either.

Interestingly though, now if you click on any link after it dumps you out at the basic site, it goes from the fallback site to the full site. (Inbox, Junk Mail,a piece of mail, etc.)

There are some more domains that have resources fetched on the full site:

skype.com
skypeassets.com
bing.com
msecnd.net
azureedge.net
advertising.com
adnxs.com
aolcdn.com

The azureedge.net and msecnd.net domains only load images.

The skype.com domain loads frames and scripts. It also uses XmlHttpRequest a lot. skypeassets.com shows up in fetches a lot.

The bing.com domain loads numerous scripts. 

The adnxs.com domain loads a script.

The advertising.com domain loads a script

The aolcdn.com domain loads a script.

Also, I went back and searched through the script that the Outlook.com redirect loads, looking for domains where it attempts to load something, and found:

office.net
adnxs.com
sharepointonline.com
outlookweb.visualstudio.com


So, candidates are many, however, the best ones seem to be:

skype.com
skypeassets.com
bing.com

Possibly:

adnxs.com
advertising.com
aolcdn.com

This should all be advertising, though. Could this be getting loaded even with Web&apos;s ad blocker?

Less likely:

azureedge.net
msecnd.net
sharepointonline.com
office.net
visualstudio.com

I&apos;m just spitballing at this point, though. Whoever wrote these sites is deranged.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422806</commentid>
    <comment_count>25</comment_count>
    <who name="Ryan Farmer">rfarmer84</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-10 11:55:27 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>Yeah, the more I look at this, the more I notice that Skype (skype.com and skypeassets.com) is _everywhere_ on the full site. 

At first I didn&apos;t think a lot of it, but the idea occurs that perhaps if the Skype APIs don&apos;t like what they see, they knock you back to the fallback site.

Curiouser and Curiouser. 

But of course there&apos;s no telling. If I had a way of spoofing the UA per domain on my end, I could just set them all to Web&apos;s default UA and play around with them until I found the magical combo that doesn&apos;t ever result in a fallback site.</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1422871</commentid>
    <comment_count>26</comment_count>
    <who name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-10 14:20:21 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>I think you&apos;re going to have to build WebKit yourself if we want to ensure this works. See https://trac.webkit.org/wiki/BuildingGtk</thetext>
  </long_desc><long_desc isprivate="0" >
    <commentid>1424010</commentid>
    <comment_count>27</comment_count>
    <who name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</who>
    <bug_when>2018-05-15 07:18:58 -0700</bug_when>
    <thetext>I&apos;m going to roll out the initial fix, since it didn&apos;t work :(</thetext>
  </long_desc>
      
          <attachment
              isobsolete="1"
              ispatch="1"
              isprivate="0"
          >
            <attachid>337894</attachid>
            <date>2018-04-13 09:10:51 -0700</date>
            <delta_ts>2018-05-09 19:06:21 -0700</delta_ts>
            <desc>Patch</desc>
            <filename>bug-184573-20180413111051.patch</filename>
            <type>text/plain</type>
            <size>2859</size>
            <attacher name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</attacher>
            
              <data encoding="base64">U3VidmVyc2lvbiBSZXZpc2lvbjogMjMwNTk1CmRpZmYgLS1naXQgYS9Tb3VyY2UvV2ViQ29yZS9D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</data>

          </attachment>
          <attachment
              isobsolete="1"
              ispatch="1"
              isprivate="0"
          >
            <attachid>340060</attachid>
            <date>2018-05-09 19:06:23 -0700</date>
            <delta_ts>2018-05-10 09:12:28 -0700</delta_ts>
            <desc>Patch</desc>
            <filename>bug-184573-20180509210622.patch</filename>
            <type>text/plain</type>
            <size>1544</size>
            <attacher name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</attacher>
            
              <data encoding="base64">U3VidmVyc2lvbiBSZXZpc2lvbjogMjMxNjI1CmRpZmYgLS1naXQgYS9Tb3VyY2UvV2ViQ29yZS9D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</data>

          </attachment>
          <attachment
              isobsolete="0"
              ispatch="1"
              isprivate="0"
          >
            <attachid>340093</attachid>
            <date>2018-05-10 09:12:30 -0700</date>
            <delta_ts>2018-05-10 14:17:30 -0700</delta_ts>
            <desc>Patch</desc>
            <filename>bug-184573-20180510111229.patch</filename>
            <type>text/plain</type>
            <size>1649</size>
            <attacher name="Michael Catanzaro">mcatanzaro</attacher>
            
              <data encoding="base64">U3VidmVyc2lvbiBSZXZpc2lvbjogMjMxNjM4CmRpZmYgLS1naXQgYS9Tb3VyY2UvV2ViQ29yZS9D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=
</data>

          </attachment>
      

    </bug>

</bugzilla>